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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
' 
LEONE M. EVANS, RALPH EVANS, 
BERNICE EV ANS STUART, and 
BETH EJV ANS JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
CL~~N 8. STUART, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10400 
RESPO,NDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the surviving widow and children 
of Hugh Alva Evans, deceased, for damage sustained by 
Plaintiff8 by reason of the wrongfui death of said de-
redent caused by the negligent acts of the Defendant 
m connection with starting and maintaining a fire on 
Defendant'8 farm in Davis County, Utah, on March 7, 
19()3. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'l'Jw case was tried before the Honorable Charles G. 
( «l\vley, sitting without a jury, following which the Court 
1,ntPrrd judgment on April 20, 1965, in favor of Plain-
1 
tiffs and against Defendant for the sum of $9,000.00 gen-
eral damages, $870.55 special damages and Plaintiff8 ' 
costs. 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial was thereafter 
denied. 
RELJE~-, 80UGHT ON APPEAL 
The principal issue in connection with this appeal 
is whether the evidence supports the finding of the Court 
that Defendant was negligent, proximately cam.;ing the 
death of Hugh Alva Evans, and that the decedent was 
not contributorily negligent nor did he assume tlH• risk 
of being burned in connection with his activities. De-
fendant further claims the award was excessive and given 
under the influence of passion. 
STATEMJ~NT OF FACTS 
Defendant was the only person available at thP 
trial who was an eye witness to what occurred. For this 
reason he was called by the Plaintiffs as an adversP 
party for interrogation under the provisions of Rnk 
43(b) U.R.C.P. 
Although Defendant has endeavored to set forth the 
facts in his Brief, they appear to reflect somewhat De· 
fendant's views as to the inferences he would like to draw 
thf>refrom rathn than the facts as found by the Court. 
For this reason Plaintiffs submit the following additional 
facts which appear in the record, as tf>stified to by tl11' 
Defendant: 
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The winter pn•ceding l\[arch 7, 1963 (the day on 
,,·Jiieh tht> fire occurred) had been very dry. The wheat 
chaff and stubble had been left on the field along with 
a nPw growth of alfalfa which had grown about a foot and 
Jiad not been f t>d off. All of this was very dry and 
brittle and highly flammable on .March 7, 1963. (Tr. 2±, 
23) Hugh Alva I~vans came to work for the Defendant 
about 1 :00 p.m. on March 7th and Yrns assigned by De-
fendant to take out a fence at the bottom of the field. 
(Tr. 25 - See, also, Exhibit A) ·while decedent was 
thus working on the fence, Defendant told him to start 
a fire so that Defendant could burn out the ditch. (Tr. 
27) Deceased told Defendant there was a little breeze 
blowing, and Defendant realized that the wind was var-
iable and at that time of the year likely to change at 
any IllOUH>nt. (Tr. 48) 
Tlw dPeeasPd started the fire as directed by Defend-
ant and then went back to work on the fence, and De-
fendant uncll:'rtook to keep the fire under control and 
lPt it burn where he wanted it to. (Tr. 30, 50) The fire 
~tartPd to spread a little into some light stubble so 
Defendant went back to his corral and got his small 
tractor to help control it. He returned and put out the 
fire which had started into the light stubble, but allowed 
it to burn along the ditch bank. (Tr. 30) Defendant did 
not want the fire to spread out into the area of the 
lwavy alfalfa stubble (See Exhibit A) and knew that 
if it did kn it would be hard to control. ('Tr. 31) He, 
thPrdon', continued to watch it sittino- on his small 
. ' b 
t rnrtor without tlw engine running, while the fire burned 
along thP ditch bank approaching a corner of the field 
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where he was located. It took about fifteen to twenty 
minutes for the fire to reach the corner of the field 
where he intended to extinguish it. Although he had not 
checked the gasoline in the tractor for several days, he 
did not check it during this period of time. (Tr. 32, 3:-n 
When the fire reached the corm~r where Defendant 
was located, it started to spread out into the stubble so 
he started the tractor and began to check it from spread-
ing and had gone about twenty feet along the ditcl1 bank 
when that tractor ran out of gas. Defendant then called 
to Rex Terkelson (another helper in the field) to take 
the pickup truck and go back to the yard for gasoline 
while Defendant kept the fire from catching on to the 
small tractor. He was successful in keeping the fire 
from burning the small tractor, but it spread out into 
the field, and as the wind changed it began spreading 
rapidly. (Tr. 35) Defendant was well aware that it "·as 
at that time of the year when they wer(l subject to quite 
a bit of wind. (Tr. 35) 
The fire spread out over a wide area as indicated hy 
the Defendant on Exhibit A and proceeded up toward 
the home and gas tanks belonging to Defendant's son, 
Deon Stuart. The flames were from one to three feet 
in heighth; and Defendant was quite concernPd and hol-
lered to Terkelson as he was returning with gasoline to 
get Mr. Evans and some shovels. Mr. Terkelson did so, 
and he and Evans rod(' up toward the house in the pickup 
truck along a roadway on the south side of the field. 
(Tr. 37, 38) Defendant put some gasoline in his tractor, 
drove around the rear of the fire where he lPft thP 
4 
tractor, an<l ran to the gas tanks. When he got there the 
fire wa8 quite close to the tanks. (Tr. 39) All three 
took shovels and proceeded to try to put the fire out 
and hold it from being right up around the tanks. (Tr. 
-i:2) 
In the mean time the fire had spread around the 
area of the home and a pile of lumber a few feet to the 
west so Defendant sent Evans over to the lumber pile 
telling him that Defendant Terkelson would be along 
in a few minutes. (Tr. 43, 44) In a minute or two he 
heard Evans call for help and called back that they would 
be there in a minute or two. Defendant then thought the 
fire was getting into the lumber. (Tr. 44) Defendant 
and Terkelson continued to work around the pumps to 
keep the fire from them; and he again heard deceased 
call for help so he sent Terkelson, but when deceased 
called for help the third time Defendant looked up and 
saw deceased on fire and rolling in the dirt. (Tr. 45, 
-16) Deceased was wearing some greasy coveralls be-
longing to Defendant which Defendant had told him to 
put on that afternoon. (Tr. 47) Defendant knew that the 
weather \rns unstable at that time of the year and that 
the wind was likely to change from one moment to the 
next. In fact it had increased considerably from the 
timP the fire was first started up to the time it spread 
into the stubble \Vhen the tractor ran out of gas. (Tr. 48, 
3+) 
On cross-Pxamination by his own counsel Defendant 
w:is asked whetlwr he felt the day of the accident was a 
~af1, day to burn and he answered. "Well, I suppose I 
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did or I wouldn't have had the fire startPtl. But it 
probably wasn't." (Tr. 53) Defendant had no intention 
of permitting the fire to burn in the area near the home 
or the improvements because it was too dangerous. (Tr. 
57) At the hospital afterwards he talked to decedent 
and asked him how he figured he got on fire, ''and he 
didn't know, unless there was fire behind him in the 
lumber or in the grass, and stuff that was behind in the 
lumber, you sel', or in the ('dges of the lumber." (Tr. 59) 
Following the introduction of Plaintiff's evidence at 
the trial Defendant moved for a dismissal, which Motion 
was taken under advisement by the Court. rrhereupon 
the Defendant rested without offering any testimony. 
Following a brief argument by counsel for the re-
spective parties, the Court took the matter under advise-
ment. Subsequently briefs were submitted by the 
respective parties and the Court later rendered its deci-
sion in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Dt>f endant. 
The Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and entered judgment on April 19, 1965, following 
which Defendant moved for a new trial \Vhich, after 
argument thereon, was denied by the Court. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS. 
6 
BPcause Appellants have referred to the parties 
as Plaintiffs and Defendant in his Brief, Respondents 
\rill lik1•wisP use such designation of the parties. 
Defendant in his Brief had subdivided this Argument 
into three topics - in each of which the claim is made 
that the evidence does not support the findings of the 
trial eourt. Before proceeding to a discussion of each of 
Defendant's sub-topics, we call the court's attention to 
it:" numerous decisions in which it was held that in con-
sidering the soundness of the trial court's conclusion 
and judgment, "certain cardinal rules must be kept in 
mind: that the judgment is endowed with a presumption 
of validity; that the party attacking it has the burden 
of affirmatively showing that is in in error; and that 
the evidence and all inferences that fairly and reasonably 
may he drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to it." (Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U. 2d 205, 
381P.2d86). See, also, Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U. 2d 389, 
P. 2d 17G; Morris v. Christensen, 11 U. 2d 140, 356 P.2d 
3-1-; Beehive Security Company v. Bush, 16 U. 2d 328, 400 
P.2d 50G. 
A. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
In claiming that he was not negligent, Defendant 
relies upon his interpretation of the evidence as set forth 
in his Brief. However, the evidence, as reviewed herein-
ahov<> and as apparently accepted by the court, clearly 
Pstabfo;Jw::; negligent conduct on the part of the Def end-
ant. The 0vidence is undisputed that decedent (while 
1nirkin.!t as an employee of Defendant) was engaged in 
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removing a fence at the lower end of Defendant's fil'ld 
when he was asked by Defendant to start the fire. (Tr. 
25) At that time he advised Defendant that it was some-
what windy, ('11r. 48) but nevertheless proceeded to carry 
out the order of his employer who took over the responsi-
bility for maintaining and controlling the fire while 
decedent went back to his work on the fence. (Tr. 30, 50) 
Although the fire was initially started for the purpose 
of burning weeds and brush in a very limited area, De-
fendant allowed it to spread up the ditch bank with the 
idea in mind that he would control it at the time it 
reached a corner of the field. He was unable to do so 
because the tractor he intended to use to control the 
fire ran out of gas so that the fire spr0ad across the 
field and up near the home and gasoline pumps of De-
fendant's son, who was also the son-in-law of the decedent. 
It was Defendant who required the decedent to join him 
in attempting to control the fire (Tr. 37); and it was 
Defendant -who sent the decedent around to the rear of 
the home to keep the fire from the pile of lumber. (Tr. 
43) Even after the decedent called for help twice De-
fendant ignored the call until after the third call wlwn 
he observed the decedl"nt's clothing burning. (Tr. 45, 46) 
Defendant even admitted that he was aware of the 
weather conditions, of the dry and flan1mable natme of 
the stubble in the field and of the variable winds blowing 
the particular day in March when the fire occurred. 
(Tr. 48) Under such circumstances there appears to lw 
no question of the negligence of the Defendant. In fa et, 
we believe the evidence discloses the Defendant wai' 
negligent as a matter of law. 
8 
This court has heretofore set out the criterion to be 
applied in determining whether the issue of negligence 
is to he determined by the trier of fact. In Best v. Huber, 
3 U. 2d 177, 281 P. 2d 208 the following rule was re-
affirmed: 
"It has been frequently announced by this 
court that negligence is a question for the jury 
unless all reasonable men must dra.w the same 
conclusion from the facts as they are shown. 
Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 
P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 
13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. Rep. 708; Baker 
v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, ·212 P.2d 679. As was 
said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 134, 
58 P. 355, 358: 
" 'Where there is uncertainty as to the exist-
ence of either negligence or contributory negli-
gence, the question is not the one of law, but of 
fact, and to be settled by a jury; and this whether, 
the uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testi-
mony, or because, the facts being undisputed, 
fair-minded men will honestly draw different con-
clusions from them.' " 
In the earlier case of M orby v. Rogers, 122 Ut. 15, 252 
P.2d 2:-n the court discussed the nature of the evidence 
which might be used to establish negligent conduct. We 
quote: 
"It is not a new or novel principle that acts of 
negligence may be proved by circumstances. Cer-
tainly, in many cases, particularly where the only 
eye witnesses are parties having an interest in 
the action, such circumstances are the only means 
by which certain facts may be discussed. In such 
cases it is proper that such circumstances should 
be evaluated by the jury in whose province lies 
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the power to believe or disbelieve the testimony 
and evidence, to observe the d{'meanor of the 
witnesses, and to draw such reasonable conclu-
sions from the whole record as may be warranted." 
See, also Sandberg 1'. Cai:anaugh Timber Co., 95 Wn. 
55G, 16-! Pac. 200, where, in an action for damages from 
destruction of property by fire the Supr{'me Court af-
firmed the following instruction to the jury: 
"It was the duty of the defendant to exercise 
that care and diligence which a person of ordinary 
prudence would exercise to extinguish or control 
any fire started by it upon its premises and to 
protect the property of plaintiff against loss on 
account thereof, in view of the nature and extent 
of the fire, the material on the ground, the weather 
conditions prevailing, the means at hand, and all 
the surrounding circumstances, and the failure of 
the defendant to exercise such reasonable care 
would be and constitute negligence upon its part." 
'Ve submit that the evidence in this ease is more 
than adequate to sustain a finding that Defendant was 
negligent proximatPly ea using the death of Hugh Alva 
Evans. 
B. and C. DECEDENT'S ALLEGED CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
What has been said above applies equally as well 
on the issue of contributory negligence and assumption 
of ri8k. As stated by this court in the ease of Ra:i/ 1" 
Consolidated Freightways, 4 U. 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196: 
''At the outset the mind of the fact trier is 
presumably in equipoise on the questio.n of 
whether the plaintiff was contributorily nPghgent. 
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'l'he burden is upon the defendant to overcome this 
balance and to impel his mind toward a conclusion. 
lf no evidence is presented, the burden is not 
met, and the finding is that the plaintiff was not 
guilty of contributory negligence; likewise, if the 
evidence is insufficient to convince by a prepond-
l•rance of the evidence, the finding is that the 
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. 
8uch finding, therefore, may be based either on 
an entire lack of evidence, or upon insufficient 
evidence. Obviously, it is not necessary that such 
finding he supported by 'substantial evidence.' 
'l'herefore, if there is any reasonable basis, either 
because of the lack of evidence, or from the evi-
dence and the fair inferences to he derived there-
from, taken in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, upon which any reasonable mind could 
conclude that is was not convinced by a perponder-
ance of the evidence either (a) that the plaintiff 
was guilty or contributory negligent or (b) that 
such negligence proximately contributed to cause 
the injury, then the refusal of the trial court to 
find plaintiff contributorily negligent must he sus-
tained. It would only be when such refusal did 
such violence to common sense as to convince the 
<'ourt that no fact trier, acting fairly and reason-
ably, would refuse to make such finding, that it 
would be reversed." 
In Glemi v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 1 U. 2d 308, 265 
P.2d 101~, this court held that where more than one 
inference can be drawn as to what a reasonably prudent 
llla11 would do under th€' circumstances the question of 
(·ontrihutory negligence is for the trier of the fact. See, 
also, Baker v. Decker, 117 U. 15, 212 P.2d 679. 
Def Pndant has cited several cas€'s from other juris-
didion:-; in :-;upport of his contention that decedt•nt was 
11 
guilty of contributory negligence. \Ye submit that not 
one of these cases is in point. Neither of these cases 
involves a fire or a situation where the relationship of 
employer-employee exists. Under circumstances similar 
to these involved in the instant matter the law is well 
settled-that the matter of negligence, contributory negli-
gence, or assumption of risk is one for the trier of tl11· 
fact. As stated in 22 Am. Jur. FIRES, Section 40: 
"One whose property is exposed to danger by 
fire by another's negligence or wrongful act is 
justified, whether or not he is bound, to make such 
an effort as an ordinarily prudent person would 
make to save it or prevent damages to it. If in 
so doing, and while exercising such care for his 
safety as is reasonable and prudent under thP 
circumstances, he is injured as a result of the 
negligence against the effort of which he is seek-
ing to protect his property, the wrongdoer whose 
negligence is the occasion of the injury must re-
spond for the damages. In many cases, no distinc-
tion is made as to the ownership of the property 
in danger. If the attempt to save the property 
is not deemed, in and of itself, the proximafr 
cause of the injuries, the mere fact that the prop-
erty belonged to some person other than the plain-
tiff will not of itself prevent a recovery." 
An extensive annotation on this subject is contained 
in 42 ALR 2d commencing at page 488. The case therP 
annotated is St. Louis-San Francisco R. R. Co. 'L Gi1111 
(Okla. 1953) 264 P.2d 351. The syllabus of that case, 
as prepared by the Court, reads as follows : 
"\Vhere a railroad company negligently caus-
ed a fire, on its right of way, which endangered 
plaintiff's meadow and plaintiff took his tractor 
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and plowed a fire guard around his meadow in 
an attempt to minimize the damage from the fire 
and then, when taking the tractor to a place of 
i.;afety, he ran over a root or branch which flew up, 
striking and injuring his eye, he can recover dam-
ages for the injury, from said railroad company, 
provided he did not act unreasonably or recklessly 
and was not guilty of contributory negligence." 
In the Ginn case the Court stated that there was no 
question hut that the fire was started by one of the de-
f Pndant's trains. The position and contention of the 
Defendant, however, was that the accident and injury 
was not caused by the setting of the fire since the plain-
tiff was injured in the operation of his tractor in attempt-
ing to prevent the fire from spreading. In analyzing this 
contention the Court stated that the plaintiff was re-
quirPd to use reasonahle means to arrest the fire and 
pn~vent loss. 
"He cannot stand idly by and permit the loss 
to increase and then hold the wrongdoer liable 
for the loss which he might have prevented. It is 
only incumhent on him, however, to use reason-
able exertion and reasonable expense, and the 
question in such case is always whether the act 
was a reasonable one, having a regard to all of 
the circumstances in the case." 
The <'ourt went on to say that the plaintiff in that 
<'U:->P ''was not in the place of injury by his own volition. 
lf p wu:;; not engaged in an act of his own choosing. He 
was di:-<<'harging a duty owned by him to the defendant 
to minimize the loss and this b" reason of defendant's 
' J 
own nPgligen<'P. Ji~quitably, plaintiff should not be re-
, :ni red to lwar the loss resulting from his personal injur-
13 
ies. Legally, the majority view is that the injuries flow 
from the fire rather than indepenrlently from the dis-
eharge of a duty imposed by the fire." 
While the annotation in 42 ALR 2d, page -l-88 doe~ 
not cover the situation in which an employee is injured, 
it does review all of the other circumstances which an· 
present in the instant cast>. As stated at page 50D of 
the annotation: 
"Where the plaintiff received personal in-
juries while attempting to protect or save another 
person's property from a fire, the courts have held 
that the one who negligently caused such fire i~ 
liable for the injuries suffered." 
vVith reference to the employer-employee situation, 
35 Am. Jur. MASTER AND SERVANT, Section 320 
states the following: 
"Another exception to the rule of assumption 
of risk incident to employment is that servant does 
not assume the risk of injury incident to his em-
ployment when the work is being done under the 
command, order, and immediate direction and 
control of the employer or his representative. 
Where such evidence is produced, the issue as to 
responsibility or assumption of risk is held, onl-
inarily, to be one which is properly submitted to 
the jury. 
It is the duty of an employee to sulmiit hi111-
self to the reasonable demands of his employn. 
not only as to the work to be done, but as to the 
manner of doing it, and it is his right to w;sume 
that his employer will take the necessary p-n:ca.11-
tions to secure safety and will not expose lum 
to wmecessary danger. This obedience a11 f'/11-
14 
ployee properly may accord even where he is 
confronted with perils that otheru·ise should be 
avoided. In any case, but more plainly where a 
command is sud.den and there is little or no time 
for reflection and deliberation, the employee may 
not set up his judgment against that of his recog-
nized superiors; on the contrary, he may rely 
upon their advice, assurances, and commands, not-
withstanding marny misgivings of his own. It by 
no means follows that because he could justify 
disobedience of the order, he is barred of recovery 
f'or injuries received in obeying it. He is not 
required to balance the degree of danger and de-
cide whether it is safe for him to act, on the con-
trary, he is relieved in a measure of the usual 
obligation of exercising vigilamce to detect and 
avoid the danger." (Emphasis added.) 
A rt-'cPnt case directly in point of this subject is the 
ease of Nissula v. Southern Idaho Timber Protective 
Asseociation, 73 Ida. 37, 245 P.2d 400. In the Nissula 
easr the vla.intiff owned a D-7 catervillar tractor, which 
he used in logging operations. On August 28, 1949 a 
forest fire was reported near the plaintiff's operations. 
The plaintiff volunteered the use of his men and equip-
nwnt and was directed by an agent of the defendant (the 
<lef!'ndant being in charge of the operations against the 
fin•) to take his tractor to the fire. The defendant com-
pi·n:-;ah·d plaintiff for the use of the tractor on a regular 
lionrl.'· rati•. Plaintiff was directed to take his tractor 
clp a mountainside to push the brush back and dig a trench 
111 pr1>w11t the :-;p1·eading of the fire. He followed the 
t 1 ad u r all(] its 01wrator and after observing that "it 
irn;-; prPtt~· J'O<'k.Y up there'' stopped the driver and re-
tmn1·d and con1plai1wd to t1H-' ::mpervisor that it was 
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not a fit place in which to operate the tractor. Thr· 
tractor was then returned to safer ground, hut suhHP-
quently as the fire became more intense the defendant'H 
supervisor directed the operator to return the cah~rpillar 
to the mountain at which time, while engaged in clearing 
brush, it became lodged against a stump and exposed to 
sudden flareup of the fire so that it had to be abandoned 
by the driver and was severely damaged by the fire. At 
the conclusion of the evidence Defendant moved for a 
directed verdict which was granted by the trial court. 
However, the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the low!'r 
court, holding that the issue of contributory negligencP 
or assumption of risk should have been submitted to thl' 
jury. \Ve quote from the Court's opinion as follows: 
"The operator had been directed to take 
orders from Cross and there is evidence that in 
going up on the hillside the second time and in 
pushing brush and dirt at the point where thr 
tractor became stalled, he acted upon specific 
directions from Cross. As to such acts he was 
under the control of, and was as to such acts the 
servant of, the defendant, although at the same 
time he was the servant of the owner in the man-
ipulation of the machine itself. 1 Restatement of 
Agency Sec. 2'l7. So if, under the circumstances, 
it was negligent to direct the operator to take the 
tractor up on the hillside and to push brush and 
dirt in the manner done, and the damage prox-
imately resulted therefrom, then the d(:'f endant 
would be liable. These were questions of fact for 
jury." 
On the matter of assumption of risk the Court fur-
ther said: 
"As to defendant's contention that the risk~ 
incident to this use of the tractor were assuroed 
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by tlw plaintiff, it need only be said that one 
doe:-; not a8sume risks which he does not consent to 
assume and which are imposed upon him against 
his will. 56 C.J.S., Master & Servant, Sec. 357; 
;35 Am. J ur., l\faster & Servant, Sec. 320. The 
plaintiff protested against the use of his tractor 
upon the steep hillside and testified he had an 
understanding with Roberts that it would not be 
so used. As to whether that applied to the area 
where the tractor was burned, the evidence is not 
clear, but it is sufficient to say that it does not 
justify the conclusion that the plaintiff assumed 
the risks involved." 
ThP Comt also found that whether the driver of the 
tractor was guitly of eontrilmtory negligence wa8 a ques-
tion for thP jury. 
See, also, RPction 7G-24-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
19a3 wl1ich makPs it a misdemeanor negligently or wil-
fully to exposP another's property to damage of destruc-
tion by fin'. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGl\IENT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE OR BASED 
UPON PASSION. 
l t is hard to sPe how the trial court could be accused 
0 1' lwing- influeneed by passion in making his award to 
l'laintiffs for tlw wrongful death of the husband and 
father. 1'he case was tried on December 17, 1964, after 
1rhieh it was takf'n under advisement. (R. 23) Briefs were 
'
11 lirnittPd h~· the rPspectiw parties; and the Court there-
'•t'h r1·1H!PrPd its dPcision on ::\fareh 26, 1965, more than 
t lil·•·(· 111onths later. ( R. :3!)) 
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Although Defrndant's brief makes sorne gt>rn•ral 
statement to tlw ('ffoct that decf'dPnt was ''not prrnlue-
tive," th<' fact is that he wa:.; earning the lllaximurn h\· 
was allowed to earn while drawing social security. .\(·-
cording to tlw undisputed testimony the decedPnt \\a~ 
earning approximakly $100.00 per month, (Tr. 9:3) all 
of which inconw was lost hy his untimely death. In addi-
tion, the Social Security benefits were n•ducecl h:-· $:i:l.(111 
per month and the Vett•ran's benefits by another $:30.00 
per month, (Tr. 102) making a total loss of inco111P nf 
at ll'ast $185.00 per month. On the other hand, tlw only 
expenses which have been eliminated by tlw death of i\lr. 
Evans were his food evpense of about $25.00 a month and 
his personal and elothing t>xpense of approximah·ly 
anotlwr $15.00 per month (Tr. 108) so that tlw suryiving 
widow has suffered a rwcuniary loss hy reaf.'on of hi,; 
death of approximately $150.00 per month. SineP )lr. 
Evans' life expectancy was in excess of 1:2 y<"ars, th(· 
total loss from this source alone would be $18,000.0il. 
However, this does not com1wnsate for all of tlw In~' 
sustained, including the loss of comfort, society, com-
panionship, and assistance, both to the surviYing wido11 
and the adult children who an• Plaintiffs in thi;:,; action. 
Again, the Court has established the criterion foi 
dt>terrnining whether a wrdict of a jury will lw :·wt a,icll' 
as being eXC'l'ssivf' and a result of passion or pn·.inili•·( · 
In the case of Pauly r. McCart71y, 109 Ft. +:n. 1~+ l'.~':l 
123, tlw Court stah>d that "the jury is allmY<'rl a ,c;Ti·:d 
latitudt> in assessing damagPs for pt>r~onal in,juriP~.·· 
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On ttH• is~1w of sPtting aside the verdict it held that: 
"tlw facts must be such that the excess can be 
<l(·terrnined as a matter of law, or the verdict must 
1-w so !:'Xcessive as to be shocking to one's con-
science and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, 
or rorruption on the part of the jury." 
CONCLUSION 
WP submit that the :B,indings of Fact, Conclusions 
nf Law, and .Judgment are supported by the evidence and 
~i10uld be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Nielsen, Conder and Hansen 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
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